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TERMINATION OF THE AT WILL
EMPLOYEE: THE GENERAL RULE AND THE
WISCONSIN RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
As far back as 1871, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
the general rule for the termination of an at will employment
relationship: "Either party ... [is] at liberty to terminate the
service at any time, no definite period for which the service
[is] to continue having been agreed upon."1 In addition, the
court decided that an agreement to pay for services at the rate
of a certain amount per year was a hiring for an indefinite
time and, therefore, governed by the general rule.2 In other
words, the Wisconsin definition of an at will employee in-
cludes an employee whose contract is not for a specific term as
well as an employee who has no employment contract at all.
The Wisconsin court's position is analogous to the general
American rule as stated in numerous treatises3 and cases.4
However, recent decisions in a growing number of jurisdic-
tions have limited the harshness of the at will doctrine.' This
comment will examine the increasing recognition of a need to
limit the traditional doctrine and will discuss some of the
leading cases. An analysis of alternative theories of recovery
for the wrongfully discharged at will employee will follow.
Since there has been some indication that Wisconsin will join
the modern trend,e this comment will also focus on the pre-
sent status of the law in Wisconsin as well as the future of the
wrongful discharge cause of action in this state.
1. Prentiss v. Ledyard, 28 Wis. 131, 133 (1871).
2. Id.
3. See, eg., 53 Am. Jun. 2D Master & Servant § 43 (1970); 9 S. WnLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017 (3d ed. 1967).
4. Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959); Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n
v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 112 P. 886 (1910). See also Annot., 62
A.L.R.3d 271 (1975).
5. See infra notes 46-68, 83-89 and accompanying text.
6. Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980). See
also Comment, Wrongful Discharge of Employees Terminable at Will - A New
Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REv. 729, 730 n.5 (1981) (Wisconsin
listed with states that would adopt the public policy exception to the at will doctrine
under appropriate facts).
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Historical Background
English common law provided a servant a measure of pro-
tection from unjust dismissals by his master.7 Employment for
an indefinite period was construed to be for one year.8 During
the nineteenth century the rule also developed that, unless
there was cause for summary discharge, employment could be
terminated only after reasonable notice.9
American courts, influenced by the laissez-faire theory of
the industrial revolution, diverged from the English rule.10 An
early statement of the doctrine was formulated by a treatise
writer and was thereafter generally relied upon by courts:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hir-
ing is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to
make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to estab-
lish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or
year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no
presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at
the rate fixed or whatever time the party may serve."
For a time, the doctrine was even accorded constitutional pro-
tection in two United States Supreme Court decisions which
struck down legislation proscribing employee discharges for
union membership.12 Additional "sustenance" was received
from the contract principles of mutuality of obligation, con-
sideration and freedom of contract. 18
7. E.g., Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the
Law, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 11 (1979).
8. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COM rAST-s *425.
9. Peck, supra note 7, at 11.
10. See generally Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged
Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438-43 (1975). The laissez-faire theory held that
the government should foster economic growth by exercising as little control as possi-
ble over trade and industry.
11. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(1877), quoted in Note, supra note 10, at 1439.
12. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908).
13. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1416 (1967).
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B. The Beginnings of Change
In spite of the universal acceptance and almost mechanical
application by American courts of the employment at will
doctrine,14 commentators began questioning its continued va-
lidity in the light of changed economic conditions and social
policies. 15 With the demise 6 of Adair v. United States17 and
Coppage v. Kansas,'8 "the philosophical underpinnings of the
[traditional] rule have fallen into decay," one author
declared. 19
Increasingly, both federal and state legislation restricted
an employer's power to terminate employees. 20 These statu-
tory exceptions to the general rule can be divided into two
main categories: 1) legislation relating to an employee's activ-
ity; and 2) legislation relating to an employee's status.2 The
foremost example in the first category is the National Labor
Relations Act,22 which protects the employee's right to partici-
pate in labor organizations and to engage in collective bar-
gaining. The laws of some states governing worker's compen-
sation also protect the employee against discrimination for
filing a claim or suffering a job-related injury.2 s Examples in
the second category include legislation prohibiting discharge
of an employee because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin,24 legislation prohibiting age discrimination,2 5 and laws
14. See cases cited supra note 4.
15. See Blades, supra note 13; Blumrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning
the Exercise of Employer Disciplinary Power. United States Report, 18 RUTGEMS L.
REv. 428 (1964); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Comment, Towards a Property Right in
Employment, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 1081 (1973); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974).
16. Legislation restricting the employer's power of discipline for specified reasons
was adopted and upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
17. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
18. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
19. Blades, supra note 13, at 1416.
20. See generally Peck, supra note 7, at 13-17.
21. Marsack, Termination of Employees at Will 2, Wis. State Bar Lab. Law Sec.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976). Other federal statutes protect employees who file
complaints or testify before certain administrative agencies. See 29 U.S.C. §§
215(a)(3), 660(c)(1) (1976). Employees whose wages are garnished have limited pro-
tection against discharge under 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976).
23. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 102.35 (1979).
24. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
25. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976).
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prohibiting discrimination on the basis of physical handicap.2 6
Public employees receive a measure of constitutional pro-
tection from discharge under certain circumstances, stemming
from the first and fourteenth amendments.27 In addition, civil
service systems and other ternurial and union securities gen-
erally protect these workers from being discharged without
"just cause."28
1I. THE NEED TO LIMIT THE AT WILL DocTmiNE
A. The Employee's Interests
The previously noted safeguards against unjust dismissal
are significant. But it is important to remember that nearly
sixty-five percent of all employees in the United States are
still hired on an at will basis.29 Therefore, the protection of-
fered by arbitration under collective bargaining agreements is
not afforded them. In addition, present legislation offers only
narrow protection against specific discriminatory acts. It is the
perceived necessity to protect these nonunionized private sec-
tor employees that has led courts in a growing number of ju-
risdictions to limit the at will doctrine judicially.30
Economic conditions and social policies have changed since
the period of individualism when the at will doctrine devel-
oped.3 1 The basis of economic security has shifted from prop-
erty ownership to job holding, and most workers have become
completely dependent upon wages from others for their liveli-
hood.3 2 In addition, there has been an ever increasing concen-
26. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1976).
27. E.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
28. Annot., 24 ATLA L. REP. 386, 387 (1981).
29. Another 21% are union members, and almost 15% are federal and state em-
ployees. See BURE Au OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 394 (1980), Table No. 652 (total labor force), Table No. 714, at
429 (union membership) and Table No. 519, at 318 (government employees).
30. See Note, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.: Tort Action for Retaliatory Discharge
Upon Filing Workmen's Compensation Claims, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROc. 659,
671-72 (1979).
31. Id. at 671.
32. It has been aptly stated that:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our
means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely depen-
dent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for the
relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the
mass of the people upon others for all of their income is something new in the
[Vol. 65:637
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tration of economic power in the hands of fewer employers.3 3
The worker can no longer go from job to job with relative
ease. The range of alternative employment has narrowed as
modern technology requires more specialization." Decreasing
mobility is due in part to seniority policies.35
This dependence upon the employer is social as well as ec-
onomic. Modern studies have shown that employees rely on a
stable employment relationship for much of their self-es-
teem.38 In addition, employees base many life decisions on the
expectation of continuing employment. Because of his depen-
dence on the job, the employee may have to submit to intimi-
dation and coercion.37 The realities of the situation do not
usually leave him free to terminate the employment himself
nor to bargain on an equal basis with his employer for a "just
cause" provision in his contract.3 8
Furthermore, the employee's interest in job security in-
cludes deferred compensation, such as pension rights, extra
vacation time, profit-sharing plans and other fringe benefits.
A wrongful discharge may cut off these benefits, giving the
employer "a windfall."39
B. The Employer's Interests
Courts have traditionally upheld the employer's legitimate
interest in running the business efficiently and profitably. 0
Fundamental control of the work place has been seen as a
management prerogative. Unquestionably, employers need
flexibility in dealing with the uncertainties of the business
world due to fluctuation in business cycles, shifts in demand
and technological changes. As a result, courts have permitted
world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's hands.
F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILosopHY OF LABOR 9 (1951), quoted in Blades, supra note 13,
at 1404 (emphasis in original).
33. Blades, supra note 13, at 1405.
34. Id.
35. Note, supra note 15, at 338.
36. See Note, supra note 10, at 1444.
37. See Comment, Recognizing the Employee's Interests in Continued Employ-
ment - The California Cause of Action for Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAc. L.J. 69, 90-91(1980).
38. See Note, supra note 10, at 1443.
39. Comment, supra note 37, at 91.
40. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, -, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974);
Comment, supra note 37, at 79.
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employers wide discretion in personnel decisions in order that
they may retain only the best qualified employees.41
The lack of protection of at will employees lies in this "as-
sumed importance" of preserving the employer's freedom to
control the work force.42 But the failure of American law to
protect against unjust dismissals is out of step with the stan-
dards and experience of Great Britain, West Germany, Japan
and other industrialized nations.43 At least one author has
suggested that "abandonment of the at will rule may improve
business productivity in the long run"44 because arbitrary dis-
charges of able employees involve a waste of training, con-
tinuity and expertise. Employee insecurity has a negative im-
pact on a business, whereas a cooperative atmosphere would
increase company loyalty and morale, thereby reducing the
turnover rate and absenteeism. The business would also real-
ize savings in the form of reduced training costs. 45
C. Balancing the Interests
Today, a growing number of courts have realized that the
employer's interests do not exist in a vacuum.46 Recent judi-
cial decisions restricting the employer's freedom to discharge
at will employees can properly be considered a balancing of
the employer's legitimate business interests with the interest
of the employee in job security. While traditionally the scale
has been tipped in favor of the employer, some courts are now
putting the public's interest on the employee's side.
IV. RECENT CASES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. The Public Policy Exception
In the earliest and probably most influential case,
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,1 the
plaintiff was allegedly discharged for disobeying his em-
ployer's order to give false testimony before a legislative com-
41. See Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816, 1834-35 (1980).
42. Peck, supra note 7, at 13.
43. Id. at 11-12. See also Note, supra note 41, at 1836.
44. Note, supra note 41, at 1835.
45. See id. at 1834-35; Comment, supra note 37, at 81 n.90.
46. See cases cited infra notes 46-68, 83-89.
47. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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mittee.4 1 The California Court of Appeals stated that the right
to discharge an employee under a contract which does not
contain a fixed duration period "may be limited by statute or
by considerations of public policy."'4 Since perjury is an act
specifically prohibited by statute,
[t]o hold that one's continued employment could be made
contingent upon his commission of a felonious act at the in-
stance of his employer would be to encourage criminal con-
duct upon the part of both the employee and employer and
would serve to contaminate the honest administration of
public affairs. This is patently contrary to the public
welfare.50
In so concluding, the court granted the employee a nonstatu-
tory cause of action against the employer.51
In 1973 the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the dismissal
of a plaintiff employee's complaint alleging retaliatory dis-
charge for filing a worker's compensation claim. In Frampton
v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,52 the court acknowledged that, or-
dinarily, an at will employee may be dismissed without cause,
but, like the California court, it recognized a public policy ex-
ception to the general rule. In this case, the employee had
been discharged "solely for exercising a statutorily conferred
right . . . . ,,53 Both Michigan" and Illinois 5 have cited
Frampton in recognizing a public policy exception for wrong-
ful discharge of an employee who filed a worker's compensa-
tion claim.
Along the same lines, the Oregon Supreme Court, in 1975,
found a public policy exception in a case in which the plaintiff
was terminated for not requesting to be excused from jury
duty. 6 The court noted that the state constitution and other
48. Id. at _ 344 P.2d at 26.
49. Id. at -, 344 P.2d at 27.
50. Id.
51. Upon remand, the Petermann case resulted in an award of $50,000 in damages
for the plaintiff. The judgment was subsequently affirmed in Petermann v. Teamsters
Local 396, 214 Cal. App. 2d 155, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1963).
52. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
53. Id. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428. The court compared this situation to retaliatory
evictions in landlord-tenant law.
54. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
55. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IlM. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
56. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
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statutes indicated the high value placed on jury duty and rea-
soned that the jury system might be adversely affected if the
employee were not allowed to collect damages from the
employer.57
In another recent case, Harless v. First National Bank,5
the West Virginia court recognized a cause of action in tort59
for a bank employee who was discharged in retaliation for ef-
forts to require his employer to comply with consumer credit
and protection laws.60 Here too, the employer's reasons for the
firing contravened an established public policy.6 1 Similarly,
the California Supreme Court made it clear that an employee
wrongfully discharged for refusing to engage in illegal conduct
had a remedy in tort. In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,6 2 a
case in which the plaintiff had refused to participate in an
illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline prices,63 the court stated:
[A]n employer's obligation to refrain from discharging an
employee who refuses to commit a criminal act does not de-
pend upon any express or implied "promises set forth in the
[employment] contract," but rather reflects a duty imposed
by law upon all employers in order to implement the funda-
mental public policies embodied in the state's penal stat-
utes. As such, a wrongful discharge suit exhibits the classic
elements of a tort cause of action."
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York also recognized a cause of action for the tort of
"abusive" discharge in Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc.65 In
Savodnik, the firing, allegedly to avoid vesting of a pension
plan, was of "virtually a model employee"66 after thirteen
years. The court specified the elements of a claim: The plain-
57. Id. at -, 536 P.2d at 516. This reasoning was followed by the Pennsylvania
court in Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
58. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
59. Id. at 275 n.5.
60. Id. at 272. The plaintiff also alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
61. Id. at 275-76.
62. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
63. Id. at 169, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
64. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (citation omitted).
65. 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
66. Id. at 825.
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tiff must prove that there is a public policy of the state and
that the policy was violated by the defendant.17
In one of the more far-reaching cases to date, the Illinois
Supreme Court extended its recognition of a cause of action to
an abusive discharge which did not undermine a specific stat-
utory or constitutional provision but violated judicially de-
fined notions of public policy. 8 In Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co.,69 the plaintiff was fired for supplying informa-
tion to the police about a fellow employee and agreeing to tes-
tify if requested.70 Justice Simon stated:
There is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, than the enforcement of a
State's criminal code .... No specific constitutional or
statutory provision requires a citizen to take an active part
in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but public pol-
icy nevertheless favors citizen crime-fighters.7 1
Several jurisdictions have acknowledged a cause of action
for wrongful discharge based upon public policy, but have
found the exception inapposite to the fact situation
presented. 72 Illustrative are two Pennsylvania cases. Initially,
in Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,73 the court affirmed
the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint alleging his discharge
for pointing out unsafe tubular products (later withdrawn
from the market) sold to the oil and gas industries74 because
the complaint itself disclosed a "plausible and legitimate rea-
son ' '"5 for the discharge. However, the court suggested that
"there are areas of an employee's life in which his employer
67. Id. at 826.
68. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 III. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981). As in Kelsay, the court allowed punitive damages only in future cases.
69. Id.
70. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
71. Id. at, 421 N.E.2d at 879-80 (citations omitted). But see the strong dissent
by Justice Ryan, the author of the Kelsay opinion. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 881-86.
72. See, e.g., Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54
(1977) (employee discharged for participating in unauthorized Christmas fund); Adler
v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (employee discharged
for "blowing the whistle" on fellow employees); Keneally v. Orgain, 37 Mont. 154, 606
P.2d 127 (1980) (employee discharged in a dispute over a company's internal manage-
ment system).
73. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
74. Id. at 173, 319 A.2d at 175.
75. Id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.
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has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of these areas
by virtue of the employer's power of discharge might plausibly
give rise to a cause of action, particularly where some recog-
nized facet of public policy is threatened. '76
In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.," the court held
that an at will employee has a cause of action for wrongful
discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of
public policy. However, the employee must identify a "specific
expression" of public policy.71 The sources of public policy,
according to the Pennsylvania court, include legislation; ad-
ministrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial deci-
sions."9 In Pierce, the plaintiff was a physican who was dis-
charged for refusing to continue a research project she viewed
as medically unethical.80 In affirming summary judgment for
the defendant, the court distinguished personal ethics from
the recognized code of ethics of an employee's profession.8 1
Moreover, the plaintiff had merely alleged that the drug was
controversial, not that it was dangerous.2
Not all states that have considered the issue in recent
years have adopted the public policy exception." Alabama, for
example, refused to create an exception because it would ab-
rogate the inherent right of contract between employer and
employee because public policy was "too nebulous a
standard. '8 4
B. Implied Covenant of Good Faith
A few jurisdictions have found an exception to the at will
doctrine based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the employment contract. The leading case in this
category is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.85 In Monge, the plain-
76. Id. at 184-85, 319 A.2d at 180.
77. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
78. Id. at - 417 A.2d at 512.
79. Id.
80. Id. at -, 417 A.2d at 506.
81. Id. at _-, 417 A.2d at 512.
82. Id. at -, 417 A.2d at 514.
83. E.g., Andress v. Augusta Nursing Facilities, Inc., 156 Ga. App. 775, 275 S.E.2d
368 (1980).
84. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977).
85. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). Most courts have refused to adopt the
Monge rationale. See, e.g., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699
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tiff, a female factory worker, claimed that she was fired for
refusing "to go out with" her foreman. 6 The New Hampshire
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he employer's interest in running his business as he sees
fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in
maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in
maintaining a proper balance between the two. We hold that
a termination by the employer of a contract of employment
at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation is not the best interest of the economic system or
the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
contract.
8 7
What makes this case exceptional, as the dissent points out, is
that the employee had not pursued the grievance procedures
under the union contract nor protested her denial of unem-
ployment compensation.88
A better-reasoned, but more limited, decision is Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co.,8 9 in which the plaintiff salesman
was allegedly terminated to avoid paying him certain bonuses.
Although the written employment contract was terminable at
will by either party, the Massachusetts court held that the
contract contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.90 Therefore, a termination not made in good faith
constituted a breach of the contract."1 However, the court did
not decide "whether the good faith requirement is implicit in
every contract for employment at will.' ' 2
V. ALTERNATIVE THEORiEs OF RECOVERY
As this sampling of recent cases illustrates, many courts
have not clearly articulated the nature of the underlying cause
of action for wrongful discharge. Commentators also have sug-
gested a variety of solutions, which are addressed separately
(Ct. App. 1980) and cases cited in Comment, supra note 6, at 737.
86. 114 N.H. at -, 316 A.2d at 550.
87. Id. at -, 316 A.2d at 551 (citations omitted). Since this was a contract action,
no damages were allowed for mental suffering. Id. at _, 316 A.2d at 552.
88. Id. at -, 316 A.2d at 553.
89. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
90. Id. at , 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
91. Id.
92. Id. at -, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (emphasis added).
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in the following discussion.
A. A Statute
Several scholars have proposed a statute specifically
prohibiting the unjust dismissal of employees, preferably a
broad provision which would leave the courts free to elaborate
on a case-by-case basis.9 8 The legislature could draw on the
accepted body of law of the arbitration process or could ex-
pand the authority of fair employment and civil rights com-
missions.94 The major weakness in this suggestion, however, is
that unorganized employees are not likely to be able to lobby
successfully for the enactment of such a statute.9 5
B. Constitutional or Property Law
Another scholar argues for constitutional protection under
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment."' Still another considers the creation of a prop-
erty right in employment more appropriate since constitu-
tional restraints on the private employer may not be feasi-
ble.9 7 The alternative definition of this new property right
(i.e., "the protection of the worker's interest in his employ-
ment from discharge without just cause"98 ) and the author's
analysis are closely related to a tort theory. However, the au-
thor is unique in suggesting reinstatement as a possible
remedy.9
C. Contract Theory
More often, commentators l00 and courts10 1 have turned to
contract law to attempt to limit the employer's absolute right
of discharge. Here the traditional doctrines of freedom of con-
tract, mutuality of obligation and consideration present formi-
93. E.g., Blades, supra note 13; Summers, supra note 15.
94. Blades, supra note 13, at 33; Summers, supra note 15, at 532.
95. Peck, supra note 7, at 3.
96. See Peck, supra note 7.
97. See Comment, supra note 15.
98. Id. at 1085 n.24.
99. Id. at 1109.
100. E.g., Note, supra note 15.
101. E.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977)."
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dable obstacles to modification of the general rule.10 2
One possible way to avoid these obstacles is the idea of
implied terms in the contract. For example, instead of
presuming that an employment contract of permanent or un-
specified duration is one at will, the courts could construe it
as being for a reasonable period, such as one year.103 Alterna-
tively, several different factors in the individual employment
situation could support an argument for implied rights to job
security: 1) separate consideration given by the employer for
the position which would include benefits to the employer,
such as surrender of tort claims or contributions to the busi-
ness, and special reliance by the employee. (Examples of the
latter are the sale of a business, changing jobs, moving or reli-
ance induced by recruitment techniques); 2) the common law
of the job which includes consideration of the policy of the
firm itself as well as the nature of the job and common law of
the industry; and 3) the longevity of the employee on the job
which would include deferred compensation and expressions
of satisfactory performance, such as promotions and salary
increases.1T '
Promissory estoppel has also been suggested as an avenue
around the traditional contract obstacles,10 5 but not all courts
have accepted this theory,10 6 and it might be difficult for a
discharged employee to prove all the elements. 07 Unjust en-
richment could be argued if the employee were discharged af-
102. See Comment, Limiting the Employer's Absolute Right of Discharge: Can
Kansas Courts Meet the Challenge?, 29 U. KAN. L. RE V. 267 (1981).
103. See Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L.
REv. 107, 122 (1942).
104. See Note, supra note 15, at 351-65.
105. See Comment, supra note 102, at 273.
106. E.g., Ducote v. Oden, 221 La. 228, 59 So. 2d 130 (1952).
107. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979), which states: "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." The Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted the doctrine in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267
(1965) and stated the conditions imposed as follows: "(1)Was the promise one which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite
and substantial character on the part of the promisee? (2) Did the promise induce
such action or forbearance? (3) Can injustice be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise?" Id. at 698, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
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ter completing a task over and above his regular duties."' 8
Under a contract theory, dismissal for cause could be used
as a standard, as in English common law, or the court could
imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as in Fortune,
so that a termination motivated by malice or bad faith would
be a breach of the employment contract.109 Determining "just
cause" or "good faith" in a particular case would necessarily
involve balancing the employer's and the employee's interests.
An advantage would be that courts are already familiar with
the good faith standard from commercial transactions. The
public policy element could also be considered by the court in
the weighing process.110
One disadvantage of proceeding on a contract theory is
that damages are limited to lost wages, although arguably the
value of lost fringe benefits could be included.1 Additionally,
if courts seem willing to imply terms, employers may respond
by requiring disclaimer-type clauses in employment
contracts.'12
D. Tort Law
Many commentators and courts have acknowledged the
greater elasticity of tort principles as the basis for recovery by
the wrongfully discharged employee." 3 As Professor Prosser
observed," [t] ort actions are created to protect the interest in
freedom from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct
which give rise to them are imposed by the law, and are based
primarily upon social policy, and not necessarily upon the will
or intention of the parties."' 14 Analogies have been made to
the torts of bad faith, 1 5 abuse of process," 6 intentional inter-
108. The essential elements of unjust enrichment are:
1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff,.
2) knowledge or appreciation of the benefit by the defendant,
3) acceptance and retention by the defendant of such benefit under such cir-
cumstances that it would be inequitable for him to retain it without paying the
value thereof.
WISCONSIN CIVrM JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3028 (1979).
109. Note, supra note 15, at 366-68.
110. See generally Comment, supra note 37.
111. Of course, mitigation of damages would be required.
112. See Note, supra note 10, at 1455-56; Note, supra note 41, at 1833 n.91.
113. E.g., Comment, supra note 102, at 273.
114. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971).
115. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 37, at 94.
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ference with a contract by the third party,117 outrage (i.e., the
intentional infliction of emotional distress)""' and to the pro-
tection provided consumers in the products liability area." 9
The primary advantage to the plaintiff of a tort cause of
action, of course, is the availability of damages for mental suf-
fering and of punitive damages in aggravated circumstances.
Moreover, it may be easier to convince courts to provide a tort
remedy in an individual instance. Implying terms such as just
cause or good faith may seem to be a complete abrogation of
the at will doctrine. 20 On the other hand, in some jurisdic-
tions, a plaintiff may proceed in both contract and tort under
the public policy exception. 121
VI. LIMITATIONS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE ACTIONS
The area of wrongful discharge is obviously ripe for litiga-
tion. But the Geary court pointed out some of the disadvan-
tages of allowing this type of suit, including the potential bur-
den on the judicial system due to the increased case load and
the difficult problems of proof. 22 Abuse is particularly likely
to arise in "whistle blowing" cases."2" It is conceivable, more-
over, that an employee who fears imminent discharge will file
a fictitious worker's compensation claim in order to prevent
the discharge. 24 The constant threat of suit may inhibit the
employer's necessary power to make critical judgments about
employees - particularly professional, managerial and other
high ranking personnel. 125
116. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 102, at 273-74.
117. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 7, at 13.
118. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 102, at 274.
119. See, e.g., Note, supra note 41, at 1838.
120. In refusing to follow Monge, the court in Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127
Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1980), called it a "substitute for a union collective
bargaining agreement." Id. at -, 620 P.2d at 703.
121. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (1980).
122. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, -, 319 A.2d 174, 179
(1974).
123. Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims Raised by At Will Employees: A New
Legal Concern for Employers, 32 LAB. L.J. 265, 278 n.6 (1981). See generally Com-
ment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle" A
Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 777.
124. See Note, supra note 30, at 680.
125. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, _, 319 A.2d 174, 179
(1974).
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The problem of proof is not insurmountable, however. A
higher burden of proof or corroboration could be required, or
the court could establish a presumption of good cause, except
for long-tenured employees. 126 Recognition of a cause of ac-
tion might lead employers to seek private means of settle-
ment, such as arbitration. 127 Moreover, providing relief for ar-
bitrary or retaliatory discharge would not deprive the
employer of his right to discharge for cause. Any interference
with his legitimate business operations would be "minimal in
comparison with the rights sought to be protected.21 28
One author fears that the "broad brush" nature of the
public policy exception to the at will doctrine could lead to
greater protection for the at will employee than that given to
unionized employees."2" For instance, the California court, in
Petermann, defined public policy as "that principle of law
which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good . .... 30 However, cases recognizing a public policy ex-
ception have generally fallen into definite categories. The first,
discharge for refusal to violate a criminal statute at the em-
ployer's command, could be considered a per se violation of
public policy. The second is discharge for exercising a sub-
stantive statutory right. The worker's compensation cases fall
into this class." 1 The third category is discharge for comply-
ing with a statutory duty such as serving on a jury. The fourth
is discharge in violation of general public policy - that is,
there is no specific legislative expression of public policy
which the court can point to so that its definition must be
grounded solely on common law principles. Monge would fall
into this category.
Most courts have rejected cases falling into the fourth cat-
egory, insisting that there be a "clear mandate" of public pol-
icy. 32 Other restrictions on the use of the public policy excep-
126. See Blades, supra note 15, at 1429.
127. Id. at 1431.
128. Comment, supra note 15, at 1109.
129. Olsen, supra note 123, at 283 n.77.
130. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
. 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959).
131. See generally Comment, supra note 6.
132. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 979 (1975 & Supp. 1981).
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tion have also arisen. For instance, it has been held that the
public policy must affect a significant interest of the commu-
nity.133 There cannot be a purely private interest at stake.134
Alternatively, the employer can argue that the statute itself
establishes an adequate legal remedy.13 5
VII. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW IN WiSCONSIN
A. Supreme Court Decisions
As indicated in the introduction to this comment, Wiscon-
sin has followed the general rule that employment for an in-
definite period is terminable at any time, at the will of either
party. The most recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions
dealing with the issue have reiterated the court's adherence to
the doctrine.
In Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,'36 decided in 1967, the
plaintiff brought suit on a promissory estoppel theory claim-
ing damages for discharge without cause after the defendant
had allegedly promised him permanent employment.13 7 The
court concluded "that a permanent employment contract is
terminable at will unless there is additional consideration in
the form of an economic or financial benefit to the employer.
A mere detriment to the employee is not enough."' "
A somewhat different situation was presented in Goff v.
Massachusetts Protective Association,'3 " decided in 1970. In
Goff, the plaintiff was an insurance agent who brought suit to
recover certain commissions after the termination of his con-
tracts with two insurance companies. 1'4 0 There was no provi-
sion in the contracts that a termination be for cause although
they did provide a method for termination.'' Finding an ear-
lier Wisconsin decision controlling, the court concluded that
when an employment contract for an indefinite term was si-
lent concerning the grounds for termination, "such silence in-
133. E.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
134. E.g., Nees v. Hock, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
135. E.g., Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
136. 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
137. Id. at 390, 153 N.W.2d at 588.
138. Id. at 394, 153 N.W.2d at 590.
139. 46 Wis. 2d 712, 176 N.W.2d 576 (1970).
140. Id. at 713, 176 N.W.2d at 577.
141. Id. at 714, 176 N.W.2d at 577.
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dicates an intent of the parties that the contract can be termi-
nated at will or without cause and the court cannot read into
the silence of the contract a reasonable or just cause."142
In Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., a 1974 case involv-
ing statutes which prohibited sex discrimination,143 the su-
preme court again noted that "[iln the absence of contrary
statutory or contract provisions, an employer may discharge
his employees for any reason without incurring liability
therefor.' 1
44
B. The Appeals Court Decisions
The general rule appeared to be well-established in Wis-
consin until the appeals court rendered a decision which sug-
gested that Wisconsin would adopt a public policy exception
to the at will doctrine under appropriate facts. In Ward v.
Frito-Lay, Inc.,45 the trial court had awarded compensatory
and punitive damages to the plaintiff for his allegedly wrong-
ful discharge." After briefly reviewing cases in other jurisdic-
tions modifying the general rule, the appeals court was per-
suaded that it was "not in the public interest for courts to
uniformly honor private contractual rights when to do so
would contravene public policy. 47 However, Judge John P.
Foley distinguished the plaintiff's fact situation from the cases
discussed: Ward was fired because his relationship with a fel-
low employee was causing dissension at the Frito-Lay factory,
"not because he was attempting to exercise some statutorily
or constitutionally guaranteed right or perform some public
duty.",'"
The court also rejected Ward's argument that his dis-
charge contravened a public policy in favor of peaceful labor
relations as stated in section 111.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes
142. Id. at 715, 176 N.W.2d at 578 (citations omitted).
143. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-.37 (1973).
144. 66 Wis. 2d 53, 63 n.16, 224 N.W.2d 389, 394 n.16 (1974).
145. 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980) (District Il).
146. Id. at 373, 290 N.W.2d at 536.
147. Id. at 376, 290 N.W.2d 537.
148. Id. at 376, 290 N.W.2d at 538. Ward and a female co-worker, although not
married, were living together at the time. The fellow employee had tried to bid onto
the same shift as Ward even though Frito-Lay had a rule against relatives working on
the same shift. Apparently, their relationship had caused employee comment, insub-
ordination and the filing of a grievance.
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(the preamble to the Employment Peace Act). 149 Additionally,
neither section 134.03 (prohibiting interferences with an indi-
vidual's engagement in lawful work) 50 nor section 134.01
(prohibiting malicious conspiracies) 151 applied. Finally, the
court discussed the Monge exception to the general rule, but
concluded that Ward had not shown that Frito-Lay acted ma-
liciously or in bad faith.152
A year later the Wisconsin appeals court reiterated the
general rule in Wisconsin as follows: "In the absence of con-
trary statutory or contract provisions, an employer may dis-
charge its employees for any reason without incurring liabil-
ity'' 53 - without any reference to Ward. In Bachand v.
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., the discharged em-
ployee had brought an action under the Fair Employment
Act, 5 4 which was specifically designed to discourage dis-
criminatory firing. 5 5 The court of appeals ruled that the Act
itself provided the exclusive remedy for lost wages due to a
violation of the Act.'56 Although the element of intent was
missing in this particular case, the court acknowledged that
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress might
be recoverable in a separate tort action.15
C. Recent Federal Decisions Interpreting Wisconsin Law
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin had occasion to interpret Wisconsin law gov-
erning retaliatory discharges in McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz
149. 95 Wis. 2d at 376, 290 N.W.2d at 538; Wis. STAT. § 111.01 (1979).
150. Wis. STAT. § 134.03 (1979).
151. Wis. STAT. § 134.01 (1979).
152. 95 Wis. 2d at 377, 290 N.W.2d at 538. In fact, Frito-Lay kept Ward on the
payroll long enough for his pension to vest. It also gave him a good job reference.
Initially, Ward and the co-worker were given the choice of which of them should
leave.
153. Bachand v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 101 Wis. 2d 617, 630-31, 305
N.W.2d 149, 155 (Ct. App. 1981) (District II).
154. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-.37 (1979). Bachand claimed that he was fired because
of his alcoholism. 101 Wis. 2d at 620, 305 N.W.2d at 150.
155. Id. at 623, 305 N.W.2d at 152. The Fair Employment Act is the Wisconsin
equivalent of federal civil rights statutes.
156. Id. at 624, 305 N.W.2d at 152. Therefore, Bachand could not be awarded
compensatory or punitive damages for emotional distress.
157. Id. at 630, 305 N.W.2d at 155.
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Brewing Co.1 8 The plaintiff contended that a private cause of
action should be implied because his discharge, for opposition
to his employer's allegedly discriminatory employment prac-
tices against women, violated the public policies expressed in
four different Wisconsin statutes. 159 Noting that the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court had not yet considered whether the public
policy or bad faith modification to the general rule should be
adopted, the district court, nevertheless, quoted from the ap-
peals court decision in Ward.60 However, Judge Gordon
found that with regard to two of the statutes, the plaintiff's
allegations fell outside the coverage of the statute.'"' In regard
to the other two, he concluded that Wisconsin courts would
not imply a private cause of action based on such policy viola-
tions because the legislature had already provided extensive
enforcement mechanisms.1
2
In Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,63 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas recently
interpreted Wisconsin law in a wrongful discharge case where
the contract for employment was not for a specified time. The
court's conclusion was that such an employment relationship
continues at the will of either party." Interestingly, the court
cited Ward as authority for its statement that this principle
remains in effect in Wisconsin.'6 5
VIII. THE FUTURE OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN WISCONSIN
It is only a matter of time until the Wisconsin Supreme
Court faces the issue of whether to recognize a cause of action
for the wrongfully discharged at will employee. Although the
Ward and Bachand courts seem to indicate opposite conclu-
sions, it is important to remember that there are a number of
other theories under which a plaintiff can proceed so that re-
covery is not an all or nothing proposition.
Some decisions by the supreme court, such as Goff, indi-
158. 489 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
159. Id. at 26.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 27.
163. 518 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
164. Id. at 696.
165. Id.
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cate its reluctance to imply terms in an employment contract.
Goff may be distinguishable, however, in that the contract in
question provided a method for termination - it was only si-
lent as to the grounds.
The court left the door open to some arguments for im-
plied rights to job security in Kovachik v. American Automo-
bile Association, 6' when it modified the general rule that a
hiring at a specified amount per year would be construed as a
contract for an indefinite period by adding that "in the ab-
sence of facts or contractual provisions showing a contrary in-
tent.1167 In the Forrer case, the plaintiff tried to show that
other circumstances, specifically, giving up his farming opera-
tions at a loss to manage defendant's store, manifested the
parties' intent to bind each other to "permanent" employ-
ment.16 The court indirectly concluded that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel was not applicable, noting that the most
that had been promised Forrer was employment terminable at
will and Sears had fulfilled that promise by hiring him. How-
ever, the court stated that the plaintiff might have a breach of
contract action if he could show that he furnished additional
consideration in the form of economic benefit to the
employer.16 9
In addition, decisions in other contexts indicate that the
court would not enforce a provision in a contract that was
contrary to public policy.170 It is only one step further to de-
clare that bad faith in the employment at will relationship is
against public policy, as the Monge court did.
The analogy to the tort of bad faith is particularly apt in
Wisconsin, which recognizes that a special duty arises between
insurer and insured by virtue of their relationship (created by
the contract). If the supreme court chooses to follow Ward,
166. 5 Wis. 2d 188, 92 N.W.2d 254 (1958).
167. Id. at 190, 92 N.W.2d at 255.
168. Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 392, 153 N.W.2d 587, 590
(1967).
169. Id. at 392-94, 153 N.W.2d at 589-90.
170. See, e.g., Griffith v. Harris, 17 Wis. 2d 255, 116 N.W.2d 133 (1962) (contracts
which impose obligations that are contrary to public policy are unenforceable);
Dunphy Boat Corp. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Bd., 267 Wis. 316, 64 N.W.2d 866
(1954) (a provision in a collective bargaining agreement requiring the doing of some-
thing illegal or against public policy would be void).
171. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
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language in that case suggests that good faith is also required
in the employer-employee relationship, even as to employees
at will. 172 Although Monge was a contract action, it seems
more likely that the Wisconsin court will acknowledge a tort
cause of action because of the similarity to the tort of bad
faith.
If the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts the appeals
court's conclusion in Ward that a cause of action for wrongful
discharge should be recognized when public policy is violated,
additional language in Ward indicates that a plaintiff would
have to prove that he was "attempting to exercise some statu-
torily or constitutionally guaranteed right or perform some
public duty."' 73 The court did not want to "second-guess" the
business judgment of the defendant "absent a clearly defined
and well-established public policy."'1 74
There are a number of Wisconsin statutes which could
form the basis for such a cause of action. 175 However, the Ba-
chand and McCluney decisions indicate that the Wisconsin
court will adhere strictly to the view that where the legislature
has provided statutory remedies for the enforcement of par-
ticular rights, those remedies should be exclusive. 7
If a wrongfully discharged at will employee could meet the
172. 95 Wis. 2d at 377, 290 N.W.2d at 538.
173. Id. at 376, 290 N.W.2d at 538.
174. Id.
175. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 102.35 (1979) (worker's compensation); Wis. STAT. § 946.31
(1979) (perjury); Wis. STAT. § 756.01(2) (1979) (jury service).
176. This could be an obstacle to using the worker's compensation statute. Wis.
STAT. § 102.35 provides penalties as follows:
(2) Any employer, or duly authorized agent thereof, who, without reasonable
cause, refuses to rehire an employe injured in the course of employment, or
who, because of a claim or attempt to claim compensation benefits from such
employer, discriminates or threatens to discriminate against an employe as to
the employe's employment, shall forfeit to the state not less than $50 nor more
than $500 for each offense. No action under this subsection may be com-
menced except upon request of the department.
(3) Any employer who without reasonable cause refuses to rehire an employe
who is injured in the course of employment, where suitable employment is
available within the employe's physical and mental limitations, upon order of
the department and in addition to other benefits, has exclusive liability to pay
to the employe the wages lost during the period of such refusal, not exceeding
one year's wages. In determining the availability of suitable employment the
continuance in business of the employer shall be considered and any written
rules promulgated by the employer with respect to seniority or the provisions
of any collective bargaining agreement with respect to seniority shall govern.
[Vol. 65:637
DISCHARGE OF AT WILL EMPLOYEES
prerequisites established in Alsteen v. Gehl,1"7 the court in
Bachand indicated that he or she could maintain a separate
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 17 8
Where there is evidence that the discharge resulted from pres-
sure from an outside source, a cause of action under the Wis-
consin conspiracy statute1 79 could be included.
IX. CONCLUSION
The American legal system has increasingly recognized the
need to limit the traditional rule that an at will employee may
be terminated for any reason or for no reason at all. By bal-
ancing the legitimate business interests of the employer with
the interest of the employee and the public, courts have at-
tempted to restrict the arbitrary or retaliatory exercise of the
employer's power. Although the nature of the underlying
cause of action has not always been clearly articulated, two
main exceptions to the common law rule have developed al-
lowing relief to the wrongfully discharged employee: 1) where
the discharge was for reasons contravening public policy; and
2) for discharge that was motivated by bad faith or malice.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not yet considered
whether either exception should be adopted. While the ap-
peals court in Ward seemed to acknowledge both, the appeals
court in Bachand adhered to the traditional rule. If the su-
preme court is faced with the issue directly, it is likely to ac-
cept some modification of the at will doctrine, but the court is
also apt to limit the source of any definition of public policy
to specific legislation which does not provide a corresponding
remedy.
FAYE L. CALvEY
177. 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963). The Alsteen criteria are:
1) that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous;
2) that the defendant behaved as he did for the purpose of causing emo-
tional distress for the plaintiff;
3) that the defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the injury; and
4) that the plaintiff siffered an extreme disabling emotional response.
178. Bachand v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 101 Wis. 2d 617, 630, 305 N.W.2d
149, 155 (Ct. App. 1981) (District II).
179. Wis. STAT. § 134.01 (1979). Although this is a criminal statute, it also gives
rise to a civil cause of action. See Radue v. Dill, 74 Wis. 2d 239, 246 N.W.2d 507
(1976).
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